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Abstract 
The present studies examined the influence of two regulatory mode concerns—a locomotion 
concern with movement from state to state and an assessment concern with making 
comparisons (see Higgins, Kruglanski, & Pierro, 2003)—on engaging in counterfactual 
thinking and experiencing post-decisional regret. When contemplating a decision with a 
negative outcome, it was predicted that high (vs. low) locomotion would induce less 
counterfactual thinking and less regret, whereas the opposite would be true for high (vs. low) 
assessment. Locomotion and assessment orientations were measured as chronic individual 
differences in Study 1 and 2, and  were induced experimentally in Study 3. In Study 1 and 
Study 3 a purchase scenario with a negative outcome was used to elicit counterfactuals and 
regret, while in Study 2 participants were asked to recall one of their own personal purchases 
that had a negative outcome. The results supported our predictions. We discuss the 
implications of these findings for the nature of counterfactual thinking and regret from the 
perspective of their relation to regulatory mode.   
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There is increasing recognition of the importance of counterfactual thinking and the 
experience of regret in economic decisions (e.g. Inman & Zeelenberg, 2002; Landman & 
Petty, 2000; Tsiros & Mittal, 2000; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004). The process of thinking 
about “what might have been” is known as counterfactual thinking. Because of its relation to 
counterfactual thinking, regret has been categorized as a “counterfactual emotion”, along 
with disappointment and relief (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Roese & Olson, 1995; see also 
Zeelenberg, 1999). There are some indications in the literature that there may be individual 
differences in counterfactual thinking and the experience of regret. Landman, for example, 
hypothesizes that an individual’s worldview “could shape the nature and intensity of 
counterfactuals and emotion” (1995, p.254; see also Landman, 1993).  
Generally speaking, it is individual differences in the type of counterfactual thinking 
that have received the most attention, such as whether individuals use upward or downward 
comparisons (e.g., Sanna, 1996, 2000), or engage in additive or substractive counterfactual 
thinking (e.g., Roese, Hur, & Pennington, 1999).  In contrast, there is little evidence that 
individuals differ in their general propensity to engage in counterfactual thinking; i.e., 
individuals differences in the amount of counterfactual thinking.  With respect to regret, most 
attention has been paid to the conditions under which people show more regret, such as 
whether the negative outcome of a decision results from an action or an inaction (e.g., 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Landman, 1987; Zeelenberg, van den Bos, van Djik, & Pieters, 
2002), whether it implies switching from or staying with the status quo (e.g., Inman & 
Zeelenberg, 2002; Tsiros & Mittal, 2000), and whether there is decision justifiability (e.g. 
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Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002; Gilovich & Medvec, 1995; Zeelenberg, Van Dijk & 
Manstead, 2000). Less attention has been paid to the potential role in regret of a decision 
maker’s self-regulatory orientation (cf. Camacho, Higgins, & Luger, 2003). The major 
purpose of our research was to examine the role of people’s regulatory mode orientation—
their chronic or situationally-induced locomotion or assessment concerns—in their general 
propensity to engage in counterfactual thinking and experience regret.   
Assessment Concerns and Locomotion Concerns 
 Most deliberate human behaviors comprise activities in two essential regulatory 
modes: a mode of assessment and a mode of locomotion. Assessment “constitutes the 
comparative aspect of self-regulation concerned with critically evaluating entities or states, 
such as goals or means in relation to alternatives in order to judge relative quality” 
(Kruglanski, Thompson, Higgins, Atash, Pierro, Shah, & Spiegel, 2000, p. 794). “What are 
my options?” “Are there any other possibilities worth considering?” “Which alternative is 
best?” “What should I do in the future?” “How did I do in the past?” Individuals strong in 
assessment mode are preoccupied with these kinds of critical evaluations (see Higgins, 
Kruglanski, & Pierro, 2003).  By contrast, the locomotion mode “is the self-regulatory aspect  
concerned with movement from state to state and with committing the psychological 
resources that will initiate and maintain goal-directed progress in a straightforward manner, 
without undue distractions or delays” (Kruglanski et al., 2000, p. 794). In the locomotion 
mode, individuals emphasize “doing”, “getting on with it”, “making something happen” (see 
Higgins et al., 2003) rather than critical evaluation. Indeed, individuals strong in locomotion 
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mode might refrain from critical evaluation if such “stopping to reflect” halted steady 
movement from state to state. 
 Whereas classic control theory (cf. Carver & Scheier, 1990; Gollwitzer, 1990; 
Higgins, 1989; Kuhl, 1985; Mischel, 1974, 1981) conceives of assessment and locomotion as 
inseparable and interdependent components of any action, Higgins, Kruglanski and their 
colleagues (Higgins et al., 2003; Kruglanski et al., 2000) have proposed that these functions 
are independent and that each can be differentially emphasized by individuals, either 
chronically as a personality disposition or momentarily as situationally induced. To measure 
chronic individual differences in assessment and locomotion, Kruglanski et al. (2000) 
developed two separate scales. In a comprehensive series of studies, these authors 
demonstrated the unidimensionality, internal consistency, and temporal stability of each 
scale. They found that locomotion and assessment tendencies are essentially uncorrelated 
with each other, that each contribute to self-regulatory success, and that each relates to a 
distinct task orientation and motivational emphasis. In generating means to goal attainment, 
assessment relates to generating a greater number of means to be compared, whereas 
locomotion relates to generating means quickly. In decision making, locomotion relates to a 
willingness to choose any activity to work on rather than waiting to begin, whereas 
assessment relates to a willingness to wait in order to investigate and compare the alternative 
choices. Individuals with a strong assessment orientation want to critically evaluate different 
options and relate past and future actions to critical standards. Individuals with a strong 
locomotion orientation want to quickly initiate action and then maintain it without disruption 
(see Higgins et al., 2003; Kruglanski et al., 2000). 
  
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
Regulatory Mode Effects On Regret 
 
 
6 
Situations can also induce  momentary individual differences in assessment and 
locomotion orientation states. Avnet and Higgins (2003), for example, had participants give 
examples from their personal lives of when they behaved in a manner exemplifying either 
three high locomotion items (taken from the Kruglanski et al. questionnaire, 2000), thereby 
inducing a locomotion orientation, or three high assessment items, thereby inducing an 
assessment orientation. Participants were then given a decision-making task in which they 
chose among different brands of reading lights. They were assigned either a “full evaluation” 
strategy where they compared all of the alternatives on all of the attribute values, or a 
“progressive elimination” strategy where they progressively eliminated whichever brand was 
worst on the first attribute, and then the second attribute, and so on. Avnet and Higgins 
(2003) reasoned that the “progressive elimination” strategy would provide participants a 
stronger sense of “movement” than the “full evaluation” strategy and fit participants in the 
locomotion condition, whereas the latter would provide more opportunity to make 
comparisons and fit those in the assessment condition. As predicted, fit effects on increasing 
the value of the chosen light were found.  
Regulatory Mode and Amount of Counterfactual Thinking and Regret 
 Individuals are assumed to engage spontaneously in counterfactual thinking after 
negative events or outcomes (Gleicher, Kost, Baker, Strathman, Richman, & Sherman, 1990; 
Landman, 1987). The experience of regret is considered to be one of the possible emotional 
consequences of counterfactual thinking. A relation between counterfactual thinking and 
regret is postulated in various models  (e.g. Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Roese, 1997) and 
there is some evidence to support it (Zeelenberg, van Djik, Van der Pligt, Manstead, 
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Empelen, & Reinderman, 1998; Tsiros & Mittal, 2000). There is also research distinguishing 
regret from other negative emotions, such as dissatisfaction or disappointment  (e.g. van Dijk 
& Zeelenberg, 2002; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, & van der Pligt, 2000). We return to 
this distinction in the General Discussion. Here we simply begin with the assumption that a 
greater amount of counterfactual thinking is associated with a greater amount of regret. We 
propose that chronic and situationally-induced individual differences in assessment versus 
locomotion concerns relate to individuals’ propensity to engage in counterfactual thinking, 
which in turn relates to the likelihood of experiencing regret.  
The central issue, then, is how might regulatory mode affect the amount of 
counterfactual thinking? Our first hypothesis is that individuals with a stronger assessment 
orientation will have a stronger propensity to engage in counterfactual thinking because of 
their concern with critical evaluation and their tendency to make comparisons. Kruglanski et 
al. (2000) describe assessors’ main aim as “to do the right thing”. Since a negative outcome 
implies having failed “to do the right thing”, individuals with a strong assessment orientation 
should be more prone to engage in the generation of counterfactuals and, in consequence, 
experience more regret about their choice. Our second hypothesis is that individuals with a 
stronger locomotion orientation will have a weaker propensity to engage in counterfactual 
thinking because of their concern with moving smoothly from state to state, without 
hesitation or interruption.  Individuals with a strong locomotion orientation are less likely to 
pay attention to a decision outcome. They want to “move on” to the next goal pursuit, to just 
“get on with it” and not dwell on the past.  
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To test these hypotheses, we conducted a series of three studies. Studies 1 and 2 
measured chronic individual differences in regulatory mode. Study 3 experimentally 
manipulated regulatory mode. Studies 1 and 3 used a purchase scenario with a negative 
outcome and participants were asked with an open question to write down freely the thoughts 
that had come to their mind. In Study 2, participants were asked to recall a previous personal 
purchase with a negative outcome and to indicate the amount of counterfactual thoughts that 
had come to their mind. Regret was also measured in each study. Because Study 2 is a 
conceptual replication of Study 1, involving an actual purchase made by the participants 
rather than an imagined purchase scenario, the basic Method and Results for each study will 
first be presented separately, followed by a discussion of the results for both studies. 
Study 1 
Method 
Participants. 83 students of the University of Rome (37 women and 46 men) 
participated in the study on a voluntary basis. The students attended different psychology 
majors. Their mean age was 23.89 years (S.D. = 3.74). 
 Procedure and materials  
Participants filled out the locomotion and assessment scales. Then they read a 
scenario about a computer purchase with a negative outcome. To assess counterfactuals after 
reading the scenario, participants were asked with an open question to write down the 
thoughts that had come to their mind. Finally, participants filled out a rating scale measuring 
regret. 
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Assessing locomotion and assessment. The Italian version of the Locomotion and 
Assessment Scales (Kruglanski et al., 2000) constitutes two separate 12-item self-report 
measures designed to tap individual differences in these tendencies. Specifically, respondents 
rate the extent to which they agree with self-descriptive statements reflecting locomotion 
(e.g., "By the time I accomplish a task, I already have the next one in mind") or assessment 
(e.g., I spend a great deal of time taking inventory of my positive and negative 
characteristics"). Ratings are made on a 6-point Likert type scale with the response 
alternatives anchored at the ends with 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).  
We computed two composite scores (one for Locomotion and one for Assessment) by 
summing across responses to each item. Previous studies including Italian samples 
(Kruglanski et al., 2000) have demonstrated that the Locomotion and Assessment scales have 
satisfactory reliability (Cronbach =.82 for the Locomotion Scale and .78 for the Assessment 
scale). In this sample, the  for the locomotion scale was .72 and the  for the assessment 
scale also was .72. Mean locomotion score was 4.41 (S.D. = .63) and mean assessment score 
was 3.58 (S.D. = .75). In this sample, the two scales were only weakly correlated (r = .21, p < 
.05), consistent with previous studies that have generally found a pattern of weak correlations 
between these scales (Kruglanski et al., 2000).  
Scenario. The scenario presented after the locomotion/assessment scales was adopted 
from those used by Tsiros and Mittal (2000, Study 1) and described the following negative 
outcome purchase experience: 
Paolo is shopping for a laptop computer he needs for work. For some weeks he has informed himself 
about the different options that are available on the market and has selected two different brands: 
Siemens and Compaq. The price and the specifications of the computers are very similar; for example 
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both of them offer technical assistance 24-hours a day, seven days a week. After thinking about the two 
options, Paolo has decided to go with Siemens. Giorgio, a friend of his, who was also looking for a 
laptop computer, has decided to go with Compaq. 
About three months later Paolo has had some problems with his laptop computer. In fact, whenever he 
called the technical assistance, he had to wait several minutes before he could talk to a technician. On 
several occasions his computer locked up, and he had to shut it down, losing all of his unsaved work. In 
addition, on several occasions he could not open any applications, and he had to shut down the system 
and try again. Finally, after having waited for two weeks, a technician was able to solve these 
problems. 
His friend Giorgio, on the contrary, has had a great experience with his laptop. He never had a problem 
with his laptop, and on the only occasion he had a problem, he called the technical assistance, and the 
technician was very helpful and answered his questions immediately. 
Counterfactual  thinking. After having read the scenario, participants were asked to 
imagine that they were Paolo, and to write down all the thoughts that came to their mind in 
this situation—following the so-called “free-thought instruction” used in previous studies  to 
examine how many counterfactuals participants spontaneously generate (Tsiros & Mittal, 
2000). The responses to this open-ended question were content analyzed, using the same 
coding scheme as Tsiros and Mittal (2000). Each response was coded into one of two 
categories: a “what-if”/counterfactual thought or not a counterfactual thought. The first 
category included responses that: “alter reality, create hypothetical scenarios, or express an 
opinion as to what might have been had a different decision been made” (Tsiros and Mittal, 
2000, p. 411). The following are examples of Study 1 participants’ counterfactual thoughts: 
“I should have asked for advice instead of deciding by myself”, “I should have chosen the 
other brand”, and “I should have made the same choice as Giorgio.”  
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Assessing regret. To measure the amount of experienced regret in this situation, a 
rating scale adopted from Tsiros & Mittal (2000, Study 1) was used. The regret scale consists 
of the three following items, rated on a 7-point scale (items 1 and 2: 1 = not at all, 7 = very 
much; item 3: 1 = not at all, 7 = definitely): “If you were Paolo, how much would you regret 
choosing a Siemens rather than Compaq notebook?”, “How much would you feel sorry for 
choosing the Siemens notebook?”, and “If you could turn back time, would you decide 
differently?”. The  for the regret scale was .85. Mean regret score was 5.16 (S.D. = 1.69). 
Results  
Control for different versions of scenario. We used two versions of the scenario, 
alternating which of the two computer brands was chosen by Paolo and by Giorgio. Two one-
way ANOVAs revealed that which of the two computer brands was chosen (i.e., the different 
versions of the scenario) did not have any effect on either the number of counterfactuals 
produced (F < 1, n.s.) nor the ratings of regret (F < 1, n.s.).  
Amount of counterfactual thinking and regret as a function of regulatory mode. Two 
separate simultaneous multiple regressions were performed: one for counterfactuals regressed 
on participants’ locomotion and assessment scores and another for regret regressed on 
participants’ locomotion and assessment scores. [Note. The zero-order correlation between 
counterfactual thinking and regret was r = .33, p < .003.] In these analyses, we also entered 
gender and the interaction of locomotion and assessment as control variables. [No gender 
effect was found (regret,  = .12, ns.; counterfactuals,  = .03, ns.)].  
As predicted, assessment was significantly positively related to counterfactual 
thinking ( = .377, p < .001; zero order correlation, r = .28, p < .01), whereas  locomotion 
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was significantly negatively related to counterfactual thinking ( = -.299, p < .01; zero order 
correlation, r = -.21, p < .05 ). [Notably, these effects remained significant when the analyses 
were repeated controlling for the number of non-counterfactuals produced.] The mean 
number of counterfactuals produced by participants overall was .74; the range was from 0-2 
and the median was 1. Among predominant assessors (their assessment score higher than 
their locomotion score), 40% had 2 counterfactual thoughts and another 50% had 1, with only 
10% having no counterfactual thoughts. In contrast, among predominant locomotors (their 
locomotion score higher than their assessment score), only 17%  had 2 counterfactual 
thoughts, 31% had 1, and over half, 52%, had no counterfactual thoughts.   
Also as predicted, assessment was significantly positively related to regret ( = .284, p 
< .01; zero order correlation, r = .22, p <.05), whereas locomotion was significantly 
negatively related to regret ( = -.323, p < .01; zero order correlation, r = -.21, p < .05). 
Importantly, there was no interaction effect between locomotion and assessment (regret,  = 
.09, ns.; counterfactuals,  = -.14, ns.), reflecting the fact that individual differences in 
locomotion and individual differences in assessment each had their own independent effects 
on counterfactual thinking and regret. 
Study 2 
Method 
Participants. 81 students of the University of Rome (67 women and 14 men) 
participated in the study on a voluntary basis. The students were all psychology majors. Their 
mean age was 24.91 years (S.D. = 4.81). 
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Procedure and materials. Participants filled out the same locomotion and assessment 
scales used in Study 1. In this sample, the  for the locomotion scale was .73 and the  for the 
assessment scale was .68. Mean locomotion score was 4.21 (S.D. = .64) and mean assessment 
score was 3.57 (S.D. = .66). In this sample, the two scales were not correlated (r = -.17, n.s.). 
Then participants then read the following open question asking them to think of a purchase 
they had made that had a negative outcome: “We now ask you to think about the last time 
you bought a product or a service after choosing from different available alternatives, with 
this experience turning out to be negative (the product/service was not good etc.). Please 
describe the event briefly in the lines below.”  The great majority of participants mentioned a 
relatively expensive product or service, such as a cell phone, car, DVD player, microwave 
oven, vacation or registration to a private school.  
Next, participants filled out  a regret item similar to the first item of Study 1 (“How 
much did you regret your purchase?”; mean regret score was 3.91, S.D. = 1.77) and the 
following item measuring counterfactual thinking:  “When rethinking about negative 
experiences like the one you described, people often develop thoughts such as  ‘If only … it 
would have gone better’ (e.g. ‘If only I had gone to bed early the night before the exam, 
instead of going to the cinema, I would have gotten a better grade’; ‘If only I had informed 
myself better, I would not have bought that product/service’, etc.). Please indicate how many 
thoughts like that came to your mind when you originally had the experience you described 
above.” (1 = no thought like that, 7 = many thoughts like that; mean counterfactual score was 
3.73, S.D. = 1.85).  
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Results 
Amount of counterfactual thinking and regret as a function of regulatory mode. As in 
Study 1, we performed separate simultaneous multiple regressions for the regret measure and 
for the counterfactual thinking measure. [Note. The zero-order correlation between 
counterfactual thinking and regret was r = .55, p <.001] In these analyses, we also entered 
gender and the interaction of locomotion and assessment as control variables. [No gender 
effect was found (regret,  = -.02, ns.; counterfactuals,  = -.02, ns.)]. As predicted, 
assessment was significantly positively related to counterfactual thinking ( = .301, p < .005; 
zero order correlation, r = .34, p <.004), whereas  locomotion was significantly negatively 
related to counterfactual thinking ( = -.231, p < .05; zero order correlation, r = -.27, p < .01). 
Also as predicted, assessment was significantly positively related to regret ( = .203, p < .05; 
zero order correlation, r = .29, p <.009), whereas locomotion was significantly negatively 
related to regret ( = -.348, p < .002; zero order correlation, r = -.43, p <.001). Importantly, 
there was no interaction effect between locomotion and assessment (regret,  = .12, ns.; 
counterfactuals,  = -.04, ns.), once again reflecting the fact that individual differences in 
locomotion and individual differences in assessment each had their own independent effects 
on counterfactual thinking and regret. 
Discussion of Studies 1 & 2 
The results of Studies 1 and 2 indicate that the regulatory modes of locomotion and 
assessment, as predicted, relate significantly to a propensity for counterfactual thinking and 
experiencing regret. Both studies found that individuals higher in assessment generated more 
counterfactuals after a negative outcome and experienced more regret, whereas people higher 
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in locomotion  generated less counterfactuals and experienced less regret. These two effects 
were independent of one another and there was no interaction effect between locomotion and 
assessment. These results answer the call of Kasimatis and Wells (1995) for identifying 
chronic individual differences that predict the amount of counterfactual thinking rather than 
the type of counterfactual thinking. 
In the General Discussion, after reporting the results of Study 3, we will discuss the 
implications of our findings for regulatory mode, counterfactual thinking, and the experience 
of regret. Here, we wish to raise the issue of what is the relation between counterfactual 
thinking and regret. Because the regulatory mode questionnaire, counterfactual measure, and 
regret measure were taken in the same session in Studies 1 and 2, there is the issue of 
potential measure contamination.  Although the assessment scale includes some general items 
related to critical evaluation, there are no items concerning counterfactual thinking or 
experiencing regret in the regulatory mode questionnaire. Most important, the same predicted 
relations between counterfactual thinking and assessment versus locomotion, and between 
regret and assessment versus locomotion, were found in both Studies 1 and 2 despite the fact 
that the participants in Study 1 received the counterfactual measure before the regret measure, 
whereas the participants in Study 2 received the regret measure before the counterfactual 
measure. That is, the predicted effects of assessment and locomotion were obtained for 
counterfactual thinking when it appeared first in Study 1, and the predicted effects of 
assessment and locomotion were obtained for regret when it appeared first in Study 2. 
Beyond the measurement issue, there is the psychological issue of how best to 
characterize the relations among regulatory mode, counterfactual thinking and regret. It 
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makes sense to begin the path with the locomotion and assessment orientations (as the 
predictors) given that, in both studies, locomotion and assessment were measured first in 
general terms and the counterfactual thinking and regret experience concerned a particular 
event (with the event being new in Study 1).  [This is also reasonable given that regulatory 
mode is manipulated in Study 3 and the basic results were replicated.] The issue, then, is 
whether counterfactual thinking or regret is the mediator. As discussed earlier, the literature 
suggests that it is counterfactual thinking that induces regret rather than the reverse. Thus, 
one model is that higher assessment increases counterfactual thinking, higher locomotion 
decreases counterfactual thinking, and then amount of counterfactual thinking determines 
amount of regret (Model 1). An alternative model would reverse this direction, with regret 
being the mediator and determining counterfactual thinking (Model 2). Notably, when 
counterfactual thinking was controlled as the mediator, Study 1 found that the (significant) 
influence of assessment on regret was reduced to non-significance ( = .10, p < .11), but the 
(significant) effect of locomotion remained significant [although  reduced] (to  = -.251, p < 
.04, from  = -.323), and Study 2 also found that the (significant) influence of assessment on 
regret was reduced to non-significance ( = .068, p > .48), but the (significant) effect of 
locomotion remained significant [although  reduced] (to  = -.244, p < .02, from  = -.348). 
Given these findings, a third model must be considered that adds to Model 1 a direct path 
from locomotion to regret (Model 3). 
To test which model fit the data better in each study separately, we compared, via 
LISREL, the  above three alternative path analysis models. In Study 1, we found that Model 1 
fit the data (χ2 (2) = 5.18, p = 0.07; CFI = .87) better than Model 2 (χ2 (2) = 8.73, p = 0.01; 
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CFI = .73), and that Model 3 fit the data better (χ2 (1) = 3.25, p = 0.07; CFI = .91) than Model 
1 or Model 2. In Study 2, we found that Model 2 fit the data (χ2 (2) = 4.32, p = 0.12; CFI = 
.96) better than Model 1 (χ2 (2) = 11.47, p = 0.03; CFI = .84), and Model 3 fit the data better 
(χ2 (1) = .88, p = 0.35; CFI = 1.00) than Model 1 or Model 2. [Notably, in both studies Model 
3 fits the data better than an alternative Model 4 where regret is the mediator and, in addition 
to Model 2, there is included a direct path from higher locomotion to decreased 
counterfactual thinking: Study 1, χ2 (1)=6.80, p = 0.01; CFI =.76; Study 2, χ2 (1)=4.16, p = 
0.04; CFI =.98.] 
What these results suggest is that both Model 1 and Model 2 receive some support, 
but the best model overall is Model 3, where not only is counterfactual thinking the mediator 
between assessment increasing and locomotion decreasing regret, but there is also a direct 
path from higher locomotion to decreased regret. A third study was conducted to obtain 
further support for our basic results. Whereas Study 1 and 2 investigated the influence of 
regulatory mode orientation on counterfactual thinking and regret by measuring chronic 
individual differences in locomotion and assessment, the regulatory modes of locomotion and 
assessment were situationally induced in Study 3. 
Study 3 
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Method 
Participants. 94 students of the University of Rome (62 women and 32 men) 
participated in the study on a voluntary basis. The students attended different psychology 
majors. Their mean age was 25.14 years (S.D. = 2.19). There were not significant effects of 
gender.  
Procedure and material. Participants were randomly assigned to the locomotion (N = 
47) and assessment (N = 47) conditions. Locomotion and assessment were manipulated by 
asking participants to think of three different situations in which they personally exemplified 
either high locomotion or high assessment behaviors and to write them down. For 
locomotion, they were asked to: “Think of a day when you made many different things.”; 
“Think of a time when you finished one project and did not wait long before you started a 
new one.”; “Think of a time when you decided to do something and you could not wait to get 
started.” For assessment, they were asked to: “Think of some occasion in which you 
compared yourself with other people.”; Think of some occasion in which you thought about 
your positive and negative characteristics.”; “Think of some occasion in which you critiqued 
work done by others or yourself.”). The situations were taken from items in the locomotion 
and assessment scales of the regulatory mode questionnaire used in Studies 1 and 2. This 
experimental manipulation of locomotion and assessment states has been shown to be  
effective by Avnet and Higgins (2003). 
Participants were told that we were conducting two different studies—a study on 
“personal memories” and a “consumer” study. After completing the “personal memories” 
questionnaire, which experimentally induced locomotion and assessment, they filled in the 
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“consumer study” questionnaire containing the same purchase scenario and regret scale ( = 
.74) used in Study 1. Counterfactuals were measured by a rating scale as in Study 2. 
Specifically, we asked participants: “When rethinking about experiences like that of Paolo, 
people often develop thoughts such as  ‘If only … it would have gone better’ (e.g. ‘If only I 
had gone to bed early the night before the exam, instead of going to the cinema, I would have 
gotten a better grade’; ‘If only I had informed myself better, I would not have bought that 
product/service’, etc.). Please indicate how many thoughts like that would have came to your 
mind if you were Paolo.” (1 = no thought like that, 7 = many thoughts like that). [Note. The 
zero-order correlation between counterfactual thinking and regret was r = .59, p <.001]. 
Results  
As predicted, two one-way ANOVAs were found: a significant main effect for 
counterfactual thinking, F(1,92) = 10.07, p < .005, and a significant main effect for regret 
F(1,92) = 4.91, p < .05, with participants in the  assessment condition producing significantly 
more counterfactuals (M = 5.74) and more regret (M = 5.97) than participants in the  
locomotion condition (counterfactuals M = 4.78; regret M = 5.50) (cfr. Fig 1). 
______________________________ 
Insert Figure 1 here 
______________________________ 
 To examine whether the different amount of regret in the two regulatory mode 
orientations was mediated by counterfactual thinking, we performed an analysis of 
covariance (ANCOVA) with counterfactuals as a covariate. This analysis showed that the 
main effect of regulatory mode on regret was not significant when counterfactuals were 
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controlled for, F(1,91) < 1, with the effect of the covariate being highly significant, F(1,91) = 
48.05, p <. 001. These results suggest that the influence of locomotion and assessment on 
regret was mediated by counterfactual thinking. The results of Study 3 demonstrate that the 
hypothesized relations between regulatory modes—locomotion and assessment—and both 
counterfactuals and regret hold true not only for chronic regulatory mode predispositions but 
also for situationally-induced regulatory modes. 
General Discussion and Conclusions 
 
 The results of our studies suggest that assessment and locomotion concerns, both as 
chronic individual predispositions and as situationally-induced states, influence the amount of 
people’s counterfactual thinking and their experienced regret. These findings contribute to 
our understanding of regulatory mode, counterfactual thinking, and regret. Let us begin with 
regulatory mode. In previous studies of regulatory mode, relatively little attention has been 
paid to the postactional evaluative phase of self-regulation (see Gollwitzer, 1990). The 
present findings indicate that assessment concerns and locomotion concerns are clearly 
distinct in this phase, with individuals higher in assessment delving more into possible 
alternatives to past actions (i.e., comparing what was done to what might have been done) 
and individuals higher in locomotion engaging less in such reflective thought (i.e., moving on 
and not dwelling on the past). In addition, the direct effect of higher locomotion decreasing 
regret is worth noting. What this suggests is that, separate from decreasing the amount of 
counterfactual thinking per se, individuals with locomotion concerns want to move on, to get 
on with it. They don’t want to get bogged down in concerns about the past. Regret is about 
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the past and not the future. Thus, individuals with locomotion concerns are less likely to 
experience regret. 
 With respect to counterfactual thinking, the present findings suggest that regulatory 
mode is a factor determining the amount of counterfactual thinking. This has several 
implications. To begin with, it identifies a personality variable that influences the propensity 
to engage in counterfactual thinking (see Kasimatis & Wells, 1995). But it does more than 
this. Study 3, after all, shows the same basic effect when assessment and locomotion are 
situationally induced. Together, these findings could help to explain why the literature has 
found both stability and instability in individuals’ propensity to engage in counterfactual 
thinking (Kasimatis & Wells, 1995). The chronic individual differences in assessment and 
locomotion could provide the stability. The situationally-induced assessment and locomotion 
could create the instability.  
In addition to this, it should be noted that regulatory mode as a factor in the amount of 
counterfactual thinking is different from what has been emphasized previously in the 
literature. Previous factors have mostly predicted the type of counterfactual thinking rather 
than the amount of counterfactual thinking. As one example, promotion-focused individuals 
prefer additive counterfactuals whereas prevention-focused individuals prefer subtractive 
counterfactuals (Roese et al., 1999)—a difference in type of counterfactual thinking and not 
in amount of counterfactual thinking. As another example, individuals in a deliberative versus 
an implementational mindset have more pessimistic expectations (Armor & Taylor, 2003), 
which in turn is related to the use of more upward comparisons but not to a general 
propensity for more counterfactual thinking (see Sanna, 1996, 2000).   
  
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
Regulatory Mode Effects On Regret 
 
 
22 
It is also notable that the motivations for counterfactual thinking most often discussed 
in the literature—self-enhancement, self-protection, self-improvement (Sanna, Chang, & 
Meier, 2001)—are outcome motives. In contrast, the difference in motivation for 
counterfactual thinking between individuals with assessment concerns versus locomotion 
concerns relates to a process or strategic difference. Those with assessment concerns are 
strategically motivated to engage in counterfactual thinking because it permits making 
comparisons. Those with locomotion concerns are strategically motivated not to engage in 
counterfactual thinking because it interferes with smooth and uniform movement to the next 
state.  The assessment motive for counterfactual thinking is of particular interest. In some 
ways, it relates to self-improvement. But it is not about how to improve future outcomes per 
se. It is about how to make the decision-making process itself better. It involves critical 
reflection on both what was good and what was bad about the process—the essence of 
evaluative criticism. This particular “critical reflection“ motive needs more direct study in 
future research on counterfactual thinking.   
The present findings also shed some light on the experience of regret. As mentioned 
earlier, the experience of regret has been distinguished from the experience of disappointment 
(e.g. van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, & van der Pligt, 2000). 
Van Dijk & Zeelenburgh (2002) report that the experience of regret is different from that of 
disappointment in that disappointment is about an undesirable outcome, an outcome below 
expectations, whereas regret involves thinking about one’s personal responsibility for what 
happened, the possibility that one made a mistake, and feeling a tendency to kick oneself and 
want to correct the mistaken decision. Critical reflection on the process of one’s faulty  
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decision making would produce such thinking, and such postactional critical reflection is 
more likely to be engaged in by individuals with assessment concerns and less likely by 
individuals with locomotion concerns. Regret, then, is not simply about negative outcomes 
per se but about one’s role in the decision process itself, and critical self-reflection concerns 
the decision process itself—what was good and what was bad about the manner in which the 
decision was made.  
The results of Study 3 also specifically increase our understanding of the experience 
of regret by suggesting that regulatory mode could contribute as a situational variable to how 
much people engage in counterfactual thinking and experience regret. Some situations or 
activities might naturally induce a stronger locomotion orientation, such as exercising, 
whereas others situations might naturally induce a stronger assessment orientation, such as 
reading a newspaper (Higgins et al, 2003). While people are involved in these different 
situated activities, if they contemplate a decision they made that turned out poorly, their 
counterfactual thinking and experience of regret might be greater in the assessment situation 
than in the locomotion situation. More generally, the influence of locomotion and assessment 
on counterfactual thinking and regret should be tested for different decision situations that 
may call for either locomotion or assessment. An example could be different kinds of 
economic decisions involving more or less time pressure and/or more or less comparisons 
that need to be made. 
Regulatory mode could also moderate some regret effects that have been described in 
the literature. For example, because individuals with a high locomotion orientation are 
concerned with moving from one state to another, taking action can be seen as a necessary 
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aspect of their mode orientation. For this reason, the classic action effect of feeling more 
regret for taking actions than refraining from action should be weaker for individuals with a 
high (vs. a low) locomotion orientation (whether chronic or momentary). Similarly, the status 
quo effect of feeling more regret when switching to something new than when sticking to the 
status quo (e.g., Tsiros & Mittal, 2000, Study 3) should be weaker for individuals with a high 
(vs. a low) locomotion orientation because switching from the status quo involves moving 
from an old state to a new state and such movement suits locomotion concerns.  
The present studies examined the relation between regulatory mode orientations and 
experienced post-decisional regret. There is some empirical evidence that regret is 
experienced not only after a bad decision outcome, but also when anticipating making a 
decision that could turn out poorly (e.g. Miller & Taylor 1995; Zeelenberg, 1999). In such 
anticipatory situations, individuals may engage in prefactual thoughts (e.g. McConnell et al., 
2000). Regulatory mode should also influence the amount of prefactual thinking and 
anticipated regret. Analogous to the results of our present studies, individuals with a high (vs. 
low) assessment orientation (chronic or momentary) should produce more prefactual thinking 
and anticipate greater regret, whereas individuals with a high (vs. low) locomotion orientation 
should produce less prefactual thinking and anticipate lesser regret. In particular,  compared 
to individuals with a high locomotion orientation, those with a high assessment orientation 
should be more sensitive to the effects that anticipated regret can have, including making 
riskier choices (e.g. Zeelenberg, Beattie, van der Plight, & de Vries, 1996; Zeelenberg & 
Beattie, 1997), inaction inertia (e.g. Tykocinski & Pittman, 1995), and postponing their 
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decision. Future research should examine these possible moderating effects of regulatory 
mode. 
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FIG. 1. Mean Regret and Counterfactual Thinking (CFT) Ratings for Locomotion and 
Assessment (Study 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
